Strategic Information Disclosure in Algorithmic Pricing examines how third-party information disclosure shapes Q-learning-powered pricing under stochastic demand. We analyze three rules: no disclosure, full disclosure, and upper censorship. Upper censorship, which truthfully reveals low-demand states while pooling high-demand ones, delivers higher profits than full disclosure, consistent with theoretical predictions. However, we uncover a robust profit reversal: when the discount factor is high, no disclosure yields higher profits than full disclosure, whereas when the discount factor is low, full disclosure performs better. This pattern is exactly the opposite of classical collusion theory. These findings indicate that Q-learning agents respond systematically to information structure and that restricting information sharing may backfire when algorithms are patient, underscoring the need to reassess regulatory approaches in AI-mediated markets .
以下对提供的研究报告《Strategic Information Disclosure in Algorithmic Pricing》(作者 Chengcheng Wang, Zexin Ye;发表于2026年7月7日,主题聚焦算法定价中的信息披露对学习与利润的影响)进行一次极其详尽的分析解构,覆盖元数据、理论框架、图表与数据解读、方法论、鲁棒性、以及政策含义等维度。文中涉及大量表述来自原文特定页码的结论或推断,分析中对应处均标注了 [page::页码] 溯源标记,以便溯源和后续引用。
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2607.04345.pdf