We propose a settlement modification that deducts a CO2-proxy amount from remuneration to eligible non‑fossil generators in high-price hours, thereby reallocating part of inframarginal rents to consumers; a static hourly accounting for 2025 implies average consumer expenditure reductions of about 8.5% in Austria and 4.7% in Germany under a 100 €/MWh threshold and a 28 €/MWh proxy deduction
速读内容
Mechanism overview and objective
Introduce a conditional deduction d(p): when the zonal day‑ahead price p_t exceeds a threshold p̄ (e.g., 100 €/MWh), eligible non‑fossil generators receive p_t − δ_t while other units receive p_t; the deducted amount proxies the embedded CO2 cost and is rebated to consumers .
The rule preserves the uniform clearing price and marginal dispatch incentives (∂(p−δ)/∂p = 1 above the threshold) while transferring a fixed component of inframarginal rents from eligible producers to consumers .
Parameterization and anti‑bunching design
Threshold p̄ should lie above marginal fossil cost excluding carbon to target hours where CO2 drives prices; proxy δ_t is set proportional to e_gas,el · p_CO2,t with an α ∈ [0,1] factor controlling redistribution intensity .
To avoid payoff discontinuities and price bunching at p̄, phase in the deduction over an interval [p_, p̄] using a linear ramp d(p), ensuring continuity and removing discrete crossing gains .
Static quantification (Austria & Germany, 2025)
Data & method: hourly day‑ahead prices, realized load L_t and eligible generation R_t (ENTSOE); counterfactual holds quantities and prices fixed and computes redistribution T_t = 1{p_t≥p̄} · δ · R_t with p̄=100 €/MWh and δ=28 €/MWh .
Incidence by technology: Austria redistribution dominated by run‑of‑river hydro (~61%), then onshore wind (~21%); Germany driven by onshore wind (~43%), biomass (~21%), solar (~15%) .
Temporal concentration and block decomposition
Redistribution concentrates in peak hours (late afternoon/evening 16–19): Austria peak block reduction reaches ~11.4% vs ~6% in Germany; morning peaks (04–07) also elevated; night hours largely unaffected .
Identity: average per‑MWh reduction = δ · (Σ_{t:p_t≥p̄} R_t) / (Σ_t L_t), explaining cross‑country differences via technology mix and load base .
Incentives and strategic responses
Hard threshold creates a discrete profit discontinuity for eligible producers: crossing p̄ can yield ΔΠ^r ≈ δ·q^r (net gain) that may incentivize supply expansion, bid shading, or demand contraction to push prices slightly below the threshold (price bunching) .
Mixed‑portfolio firms face condition Δp < δ·R/(R+F) for profitable manipulation (Δp = p* − p̄); incentives increase with renewable share R/(R+F) .
Linear ramp eliminates the discrete gain: within the ramp ∂(p−d(p))/∂p = 1 − δ/(p̄−p_) and continuous remuneration removes the crossing incentive when δ ≤ p̄ − p_ .
Implementation options and interactions
Two implementations: (i) auction settlement change (requires technology tagging/unit‑based bids) or (ii) technology‑specific levy outside the auction with identical economic incidence; the levy may be administratively simpler and compatible with current order books .
Interaction with two‑way CfDs: new plants under CfDs are exempt (settle on the unadjusted p_t), so the mechanism targets existing spot‑exposed generation while preserving investment certainty for new projects .
Crisis (gas‑cost) variant and illustrative 2022 counterfactual
Define MC_t for reference fossil plant and set δ_t = max{0, MC_t − MC^ref}; apply linear ramp with dynamic upper bound p̄_t = p_ + φ δ_t to rebate excess fossil cost components in crisis episodes .
July–Dec 2022 simulation (calibrated MC^ref to gas 40 €/MWh_th and EU ETS 2021 prices, φ=4/3) yields net consumer expenditure drops ~30.2% (AT) and ~24.5% (DE); eligible generators still receive substantial remuneration—scheme delivers sizable consumer relief without subsidizing fossil generation as the Iberian cap did .
Sensitivity and policy variants (selected table)
Zone
Policy
Expenditure Base (m€)
Absolute Reduction (m€)
Expenditure New (m€)
Reduction (%)
Base Price (€/MWh)
New Price (€/MWh)
AT
HT
6,178
528
5,649
8.55
104.4
95.47
AT
LR
6,178
731
5,446
11.84
104.4
92.04
DE
HT
43,207
2,037
41,170
4.71
92.79
88.41
DE
LR
43,207
3,235
39,973
7.49
92.79
85.84
HT = hard threshold (100 €/MWh), LR = linear ramp (72→100 €/MWh), δ = 28 €/MWh; table reproduces reported policy comparison and demonstrates larger savings under a linear ramp that also reduces bunching incentives .
(Overall summary) The proposal is a rule‑based, revenue‑neutral mechanism to reallocate embedded CO2 (or fuel) cost components from inframarginal producers to consumers in high‑price states while preserving marginal price signals; careful parameter choice (threshold, δ, ramp width) and institutional implementation (unit tagging or levy) are crucial to avoid short‑run bidding distortions and long‑run investment disincentives .
思维导图
深度阅读
元数据与报告概览
报告标题:A Market Design Proposal for Decoupling Carbon and Electricity Prices;作者:Simon Finster, Bernhard Kasberger, Simon Rütten;发布日期:2026-03-30;主题:提出一种在欧洲日前电力市场中“在高价时对非化石发电实行定额CO2代理扣减”的市场结算设计,旨在将部分因碳成本所产生的inframarginal rents(超额边际租金)从非排放发电者转移给消费者,从而缓和碳价与电价的耦合效应。
核心结论(高层摘要)
报告主张:在日内统一出清价格高于预设阈值时,对合格的非化石发电(风、光、水、核、生物质等)支付“p - δ” 而非 p,从而把固定的 CO2 成本代理值 δ 在高价时从非化石发电的inframarginal rent中回拨给消费者,目标是减少消费者支出并保持边际出力激励与配置效率。
报告提出的 CO2 代理扣减是一种制度化、规则化、可指数化(与碳价联动)的再分配工具,核心优势在于:它在不改变边际出清价格与化石边际信号的前提下,把高价时的固定碳成本成分从非化石发电者的inframarginal rents回拨给消费者,从而在短期内减轻消费负担并支持电气化激励(因电价对消费者影响减轻)。