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This paper models the US–China AGI competition as a continuous-time preemption (option) game with an endogenous existential-ruin parameter D and shows that, because the expected catastrophe cost cancels across leader and follower payoffs, competitive pressures can create a “suicide region” where actors rationally deploy AGI early despite negative risk‑adjusted NPV; the paper derives threshold formulae, the saviour-premium effect under asymmetric beliefs, and policy levers (private liability, windfall sharing, verifiability) that can restore the option value of waiting .
元数据与概览(引言与报告概览)
逐节深度解读
图表深度解读(Figure 1)
估值与政策对策(Valuation & Mechanism design)
风险因素评估(Risk factors)
批判性视角与模型限制(审慎视角)
结论性综合
(注:文中所有对原文结论或数据的直接陈述均已在句末标注来源页码,以便溯源与进一步引用。)
2512.07526.pdf