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This paper develops a Stackelberg security-game framework for cyber-risk allocation on networks, combining contagion-based risk measures and attacker/defender heterogeneous value profiles to derive (asymptotic) closed-form approximations of optimal defence allocations and scalable path-based risk metrics; numerical experiments (efficient frontiers, allocation patterns, and robustness to dynamic contagion) show targeted immunization, cyber-deception effects, and topology-dependent trade-offs between cost and systemic risk .
元数据与概览(引言与报告概览)
逐节深度解读
图表与关键定义深度解读(Section 3 的网络度量与图示)
图表与数值实验(Section 4)详解与解读
估值/方法论分析(数学方法与近似讨论)
风险因素评估与作者识别的局限
批判性视角与细微差别(基于报告内容的审慎评估)
结论性综合与关键发现汇总
附:关键图像(报告中的图示,便于阅读对照)
結語(简短建议)
2601.16805.pdf