Quantifying Sub-Optimality in Routing for Automated Market Makers
发表于 2026年7月22日上传于 2026年7月24日
We provide a large-scale empirical audit of DEX routing using 2.98 million WETH–USDC swaps on Ethereum. We compare realized routes with optimized benchmarks, finding an average shortfall of 2.02 bps per trade, amounting to about \$24 million on roughly \$120 billion of volume. We introduce three reproducible optimal benchmarks—SCO (activated pools only), FVO (all pools, no gas), and G-FVO (gas-aware)—and a scalable bisection-based routing algorithm to compute these benchmarks. The study highlights two regularities: information timeliness critically affects routing outcomes, and inefficiency is heavy-tailed with a few extreme outliers driving most of the dollar losses. Sandwiching attacks emerge as a concrete channel for routing sub-optimality. The framework provides a rigorous, reproducible basis for timing-aware, gas-aware routing improvements
HabitatAgent: An End-to-End Multi-Agent System for Housing Consultation
Distributive Politics, Representation, and Redistricting∗
发表于 2026年3月31日上传于 2026年4月3日
This theoretical paper develops a multi-district model that endogenizes voter pivotality to link redistricting, candidate selection, and the equilibrium allocation of group-targeted transfers; it shows two channels — a competition channel (how district composition alters targeting incentives) and a selection channel (how it alters who is nominated/elected) — whose curvature properties determine whether packing or dispersion best serves minority welfare, and demonstrates that endogenous feedback in competitive (tipping) districts can produce nonmonotonic welfare in minority concentration .
本文建立基于 global game 的理论框架,刻画稳定币面临的两类主要风险:因大额赎回产生的“large sale risk”与因准备金质量差产生的“collateral risk”,并将总体跑兑概率分解为两部分以分析信息不确定性(公共信息精度与私人信号分散度)对这两类风险的相反影响及阈值效应,指出在若干参数区间中信息不透明反而能增强稳定性,这一结论可解释多起实证事件并对监管设计(如公开披露与审计机制)提出政策建议
The nonstationarity-complexity tradeoff in return prediction